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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AT'TORNEY & CLIENT:
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS FOR LAWYERS:
WHERE SHOULD NORTH DAKOTA DRAW THE LINE?
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. CT. 2720 (1991).
I. INTRODUCTION
Dominic P. Gentile, an attorney, was hired to represent
Grady Sanders, who was indicted on criminal charges of larceny,
racketeering, and drug trafficking.' Mr. Sanders was the owner of
Western Vault Corporation, a company that safeguarded drugs
and traveler's checks for the police as part of an undercover opera-
tion.2 On January 31, 1987, the Intelligence Bureau of the Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department discovered that four kilo-
grams of cocaine and approximately $300,000 in traveler's checks
had been stolen from the Western Vault safety deposit boxes
rented by the police.3 Shortly after the media reported the theft,
other Western Vault customers claimed that money had been sto-
len from their safety deposit boxes as well.' Although Metro
Police officers and employees of Western Vault were considered
possible suspects, the police eventually charged Mr. Sanders with
the crimes. Progress reports on the investigation of the theft
were highly publicized.'
1. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2727 (1991); Briefs for Petitioner and
Respondent, joint app. at 127, Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No. 89-
1836) [hereinafter Joint Appendix] (quoting LAS VEGAS SUN, February 6, 1988, at 1A).
Specifically, the indictment charged Grady Sanders with eight counts of grand larceny, two
counts of racketeering and one count of trafficking in a controlled substance. Id. "The
indictment included not only the theft of $1.3 million of narcotics and traveler's checks
from the Metro [Police] safety deposit box but, in addition, a series of alleged thefts of more
than $2 million from seven safety deposit boxes rented by other customers." Brief for
Petitioner at 6, Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No. 89-1836) (citation
omitted).
2. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2727.
3. Id.
4. id.
5. Id. Two police officers in particular, Steve Scholl and Ed Schaub, had direct access
to the safety deposit boxes during the period of time when the theft occurred. Id. In
addition, the undercover team kept no record of access to the vault. Id. Although this
evidence appeared to incriminate the police officers, they were cleared of suspicion
approximately a week after the discovery of the theft. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Gentile (No.
89-1836).
Throughout the investigation the press continued to report that the two officers had
been cleared as possible suspects. Joint Appendix at 91, 93, 98, 110, 132, Gentile (No. 89-
1836). A report that the officers had voluntarily taken and passed polygraph tests may have
added to the officers' credibility. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2727 (1991).
6. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2727-28, 2738. "[Mr. Gentile] had monitored the publicity
surrounding the case, and prior to the indictment was personally aware of at least 17
articles in the major local newspapers, the Las Vegas Sun and Las Vegas Review-Journal,
and numerous local televisions news stories which reported on the Western Vault theft and
ensuing investigation." Id. at 2728.
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In response to adverse publicity about his client,7 Mr. Gentile
sponsored a press conference during which he claimed that his cli-
ent was innocent,' that evidence indicated that police officers
committed the crimes,9 and that other customers who reported
thefts from their safety deposit boxes were not credible, because
most of them were drug dealers or convicted money launderers
who had accused Gentile's client in response to police pressure. 0
In preparation for the press conference, Mr. Gentile reviewed
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, a rule governing trial publicity,
and determined that it was proper to speak to the press on behalf
of his client because the trial was more than six months away.1 '
During the press conference, he commented about what the
admissible trial evidence would prove and steered clear of inad-
7. Id. Mr. Sanders did not receive the benefit of positive press enjoyed by Officers
Scholl and Schaub. Joint Appendix at 91, 93, 98, 110, 132, Gentile (No. 89-1836) (quoting
LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, March 12, 1987, at IB; LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, March
26, 1987, at IB; and KLAS, Television Channel 8 News Summary, March 10, 1987 and June
1, 1987). As the investigation progressed, all of the Western Vault Company employees
were cleared of suspicion, except for Mr. Sanders. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Gentile (No. 89-
1836). Police sources alleged that Mr. Sanders was uncooperative because he refused to
take a lie detector test, and because he failed to answer questions to the satisfaction of the
Police Department. Id. at 3-5. Thus, Mr. Sanders appeared to be the guilty party because
the police repeatedly released statements stating that the two officers had been cleared of
wrongdoing, while claiming that Mr. Sanders had been uncooperative. As a result, Mr.
Gentile decided that he had to point out weaknesses in the State's case in order to prevent
the jury venire from being prejudiced. Petitioner's Brief at 7 & n.6, Gentile (No. 89-1836).
8. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2736 (quoting Petitioner's Opening Remarks at the Press
Conference of February 5, 1988).
9. Id. at 2736-37.
10. Id. at 2737. Mr. Gentile alleged that four of the customers who had reported thefts
from their safety deposit boxes were "drug dealers; three of whom didn't say a word about
anything until after they were approached by Metro [Police] and after they were already in
trouble and [were] trying to work themselves out of something." Id.
11. Id. at 2729. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is reprinted in Appendix B of the
Gentile opinion. Id. at 2737-38.
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is virtually identical to Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2723. Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct provides:
Trial Publicity
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.
(b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) ordinarily is likely to have such
an effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or
any other proceeding that could result in incarceration, and the statement
relates to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party,
suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or
the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the
possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any
confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that
person's refusal or failure to make a statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or
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missible evidence. 12 Several times during the press conference he
declined to answer questions because he believed that the answers
might result in a breach of the trial publicity rule. 13
Approximately six months after the press conference, Gen-
tile's client was tried and acquitted on all charges.' 4 In December
of 1988, the State Bar of Nevada filed an ethics complaint against
Mr. Gentile in which it contended that he violated the Nevada
trial publicity rule.' 5
The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State Bar con-
ducted a hearing and concluded that Gentile violated Rule 177
and should be privately reprimanded.' 6 Mr. Gentile appealed to
failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or
nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a.
criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to
be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a
substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there
is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an
accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless
proven guilty.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b) (1-5), a lawyer involved in the
investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(1) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(2) the information contained in the public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the
general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense involved
and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved,
when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial
harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the
accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary
to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies
and the length of the investigation.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991) (emphasis added).
12: Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2730.
13. See id. at 2731-32; Brief for Petitioner, Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 6a-16a, Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (No. 89-1836).
14. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2723.
15. Id. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is reprinted in Appendix B of the Gentile
opinion. Id. at 2737-38.
16. Id. at 2723. The Board concluded as follows:
The statements made by Gentile violated SCR 177(1), (2Xa) and (2Xd) in that
they were statements which Gentile knew would be disseminated by means of
public communication; which (i) related to the character, credibility, reputation
and criminal record of witnesses in the trial of Mr. Sanders, and (ii) contained an
opinion of the guilt or innocence of Mr. Sanders; and were known or should have
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the Nevada Supreme Court, and it found that Mr. Gentile knew or
should have known that his statements during the press confer-
ence would have a "substantial likelihood" of materially prejudic-
ing the trial of his client. 17 Accordingly, the Nevada court affirmed
the decision of the Board.' 8
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Gentile
argued that the Court should satisfy both First-Amendment-free-
speech and Sixth-Amendment-fair-trial interests by insisting that
"a 'clear and present danger' of 'actual prejudice or an imminent
threat'" to a fair trial be demonstrated before protected speech is
suppressed.' 9 All nine members of the Court agreed that, under
most circumstances, the right to freedom of speech is protected
unless there is a "clear and present danger to the impartiality and
good order of the courts."2 ° The Court has also agreed that pro-
tection of this First Amendment right is especially important
where the government suppresses political speech.2 The Justices
did not agree, however, on whether this speech-protective stan-
dard applies to lawyers who are participating in a judicial
proceeding.22
been known by Gentile to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
the Sanders trial.
Joint Appendix at 5, Gentile (No. 89-1836) (quoting the State Bar of Nevada, Southern
Nevada Disciplinary Board, May 12, 1989).
17. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 787 P.2d 386, 387 (1990). The Nevada Supreme Court
stated that "[c]lear and convincing evidence supports the conclusion that appellant knew or
reasonably should have known that his comments had a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing the adjudication of his client's case." Id. The "substantial likelihood" language
is taken from Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177. NEV. CT. R. 177 (1991). Rule 177(1)
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding." Id.
18. Gentile, 787 P.2d at 386.
19. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2742 (1991); Petitioner's Brief at 15,
Gentile (No. 89-1836). Mr. Gentile argued that the Sixth-Amendment-fair-trial interests of
the state should not be given preference over the First-Amendment-free-speech rights of
attorneys. Petitioner's Brief at 15, Gentile (No. 89-1836). This argument was based in part
on the following language from Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart: "The founders of the Bill of
Rights did not assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights,
ranking one as superior to the other." Petitioner's Brief at 15, Gentile (No. 89-1836)
(quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976)).
20. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2726, 2742-43. Justice Kennedy reiterated the following
definition of the "clear and present danger" standard:
"Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech ... are alleged to have been
invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there
actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was
imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify
the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature."
Id. at 2726 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 2724.
22. Id. at 2732-36, 2743-45.
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In the portion of the decision written by Justice Rehnquist, 23
the majority phrased the issue presented as follows: "The question
we must answer in this case is whether a lawyer who represents a
defendant involved with the criminal justice system may insist on
the [clear and present danger] standard before he is disciplined for
public pronouncements about the case, or whether the State
instead may penalize that sort of speech upon a lesser showing. 24
The Court held that "the 'substantial likelihood of material preju-
dice' standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance
between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending
cases and the state's [Sixth Amendment] interest in fair trials." 25
The second portion of the Gentile decision was written by Jus-
tice Kennedy.26 In this part of the opinion, a different majority of
the Court 27 held that, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme
Court, Rule 177(3) was unconstitutionally vague because the safe
harbor provision in subsection (3) of the rule misled Gentile into
thinking that he could violate subsections (1) and (2) during his
press conference without fear of discipline. 2' The Court found
that subsection three of Rule 177 failed to provide fair notice of
what type of speech was prohibited.29 The Court also noted that
23. Id. at 2738-45. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion with respect to
parts I and II of the decision. Id. Justices White, Scalia, Souter and O'Connor joined in this
portion of the opinion. Id. at 2738, 2748. Parts I and II address the appropriate standard of
review to be applied in cases where there is a conflict between a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial and an attorney's First Amendment right to freedom of
speech. Id. at 2738-45.
24. Id. at 2743. The "clear and present danger" standard is used to determine whether
the First Amendment rights of the press or the general public have been violated. Id. at
2742-43.
25. Id. at 2745.
26. Id. at 2723-36.
27. Id. at 2723. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion with respect to Parts III
and VI of the decision. Id. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor joined in
these parts of the opinion. Id. In part III, the Court held that Nevada Supreme Court Rule
177 was unconstitutionally vague. ld. at 2732. Part VI is simply the judgment of the
Court-"the Supreme Court of Nevada is reversed." Id. at 2736.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered a dissenting opinion with respect to part III of the
opinion. Id. at 2745-48. He argued that Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 was
constitutional on its face and as applied. Id. In reaching this conclusion, he rejected the
Petitioner's argument that Rule 177 was vague and overbroad. Id. Justices White, Scalia,
and Souter joined in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 2738.
28. Id. at 2731. In referring to Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 as a safe harbor
provision, Justice Kennedy argued that as long as an attorney makes some overt attempt to
comply with one subsection of the rule, he will not be disciplined for violating a different
subsection of the rule. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731-32; NEV. SuP. CT. RULE 177
(reprinted in Appendix B of the Gentile opinion). The "notwithstanding" provision of Rule
177 leads an attorney to believe that if he or she makes an overt attempt to comply with
Rule 177(3), namely, by making a statement about "the general nature of the ... defense,"
the attorney will not be disciplined even if this statement appears to violate subsections 1 or
2. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731-32. See also infra text accompanying notes 91-101
(discussing why Rule 177(3) was found to be void for vagueness).
29. Id. at 2732.
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the rule was so imprecise that it allowed for discriminatory
enforcement. 30  Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Nevada Supreme Court.
31
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ATTORNEY
"NO-COMMENT" RULES
Since 1908, the American Bar Association (ABA) has issued
three model rules in an attempt to restrict extrajudicial statements
made by lawyers. The first model rule was Canon 20 of the 1908
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.32 Pursuant to Canon 20, com-
ments made by lawyers regarding pending or anticipated litiga-
tion were "generally" condemned. 33 This standard was seldom
enforced, however, because courts considered it too vague.34
In the 1960s, fair trial and free speech issues were sharply
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2736.
32. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 20 (1908). Canon
20 provides:
20. Newspaper Discussion of Pending Litigation.
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme
circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is
unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should
not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the Court; but
even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The trouble [with
Canon 20] was that the standards were so general and vague that they were exceedingly
difficult to apply and did little to forewarn speakers for publication about what was
proscribed and what was permitted."); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS Tentative Draft 80-81 (December 1966) (The general language in Canon 20 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics "fails to give adequate guidance and it is perhaps for this
reason that it has not been enforced.").
Varying interpretations of Canon 20 provide evidence for the assertion that the rule
was vague and difficult to apply. For example, in State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841 (N.J.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965), the court interpreted Canon 20 to ban statements
to news media by prosecutors or defense counsel which may interfere with a fair trial. Id.
at 852. The Van Duyne court stated that "[tihe right of the State to a fair trial cannot be
impeded or diluted by out-of-court assertions by [defense counsel] to news media on the
subject of his client's innocence." Id. However, the court in Koller v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 737 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 808 (1985), took the opposite
approach:
The Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar has emphasized
with respect to the current D.C. version of DR 7-107(H) [which incorporated
Canon 20] that it "would hesitate to interpret the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Canons of Professional Ethics in such a way as to thwart the
communication of accurate factual information regarding legal proceedings to
the press in the absence of a substantial threat to the due administration of
justice."
Id. at 1062-63 (citation omitted).
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debated due to the press coverage of former President John F.
Kennedy's assassination in 1962, 35 and the Court's ruling in Shep-
pard v. Maxwell36 decided in 1966 .3 The Sheppard decision and
the Warren Commission's report led to further professional study
and the ABA's adoption of fair trial and free speech standards in
1968.38 These standards limited lawyer publicity that presented a
"reasonable likelihood that such dissemination [would] interfere
35. Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-
Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 395 (1968) (quoting The President's Commission on the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Report of the President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy 238 (1964)).
The events surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy in November
1963 graphically illustrate the effect of pervasive news coverage and publicity on
the right of a defendant to a trial by an impartial jury. Because of this publicity,
the President's Commission felt, "it would have been a most difficult task to
select an unprejudiced jury, either in Dallas or elsewhere."
Id.
36. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard v. Maxwell, Marilyn Sheppard, the pregnant wife
of the defendant, was bludgeoned to death. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966).
Before the trial, the media was bombarded with stories about the case and Dr. Sheppard's
personal problems. Id. at 338-42. Most of the stories tended to incriminate Dr. Sheppard.
Id. at 340. Three months before the trial, the coroner called an inquest. Id. at 339.
"Sheppard's counsel were present during the three-day inquest but were not permitted to
participate." Id. Several weeks before the trial, the names of the prospective jurors were
published, resulting in phone calls and letters about the case. Id. at 342. The trial court did
nothing to limit the incriminating pretrial publicity. Id. at 338-42.
The negative publicity continued during trial. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 342-49.
Approximately twenty members of the press crowded the 26' X 48' courtroom and
reporters continually disrupted the trial. Id. at 342-44. Pictures of the jury appeared more
than 40 times in the local papers. Id. at 345. During deliberations, the jury was allowed
inadequately supervised access to telephones. Id. at 349. "The jurors themselves were
constantly exposed to the news media." Id. at 345. Some of the jurors may have seen
stories that mentioned incriminating evidence not admitted during the trial. Id. at 340,
344. The trial judge did nothing to limit the massive publicity. Id. at 344, 346-49. In the
end, Dr. Sheppard was convicted of second-degree murder. Id. at 335.
The Supreme Court concluded that the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity
that accompanied Dr. Sheppard's murder prosecution denied him a fair trial. Sheppard,
384 U.S. at 362-63. The Court stated that, to secure a defendant's right to a fair trial, "the
trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party,
witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters,.., the identity of prospective
witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief in guilt or innocence; or like statements
concerning the merits of the case." Id. at 361.
In the conclusion of the majority opinion, Justice Clark also warned the courts to take
control of their courtrooms. Id. at 363. "Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the
court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and the
press .. .is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures." Id.
The Sheppard Court, however, did not discuss the extent to which First Amendment
rights might restrict the trial court's power to regulate the speech of trial participants. See
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 240 (1984)
(discussing the legal background of Rule 3.6 of the Model Code of Professional Conduct);
Gannett Co., Inc. v. State of Delaware, 571 A.2d 735, 742 (Del. 1989) ("While Sheppard did
not specifically involve a First Amendment challenge, we nevertheless keep in mind its
principles when extensive media activity threatens a party's fundamental right to a fair
trial."). Thus, Sheppard cannot be read as a limitation of First Amendment rights; it is
simply an assertion of the importance of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
37. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2740-41 (1991).
38. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
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with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of
justice."3 9
In 1969, the ABA replaced the 1908 canons with the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.4" Disciplinary Rule 7-107 (DR
7-107) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility incorpo-
rated the 1968 fair trial-free press standards regarding lawyer no-
comment rules.41 Accordingly, the general test of DR 7-107 is
STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS Tentative Draft 19 (December
1966).
The Advisory committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, one of six advisory
committees established by the American Bar Association to formulate minimum
standards for the administration of criminal justice, was appointed in December
1964. It owes its origin in part to the report of the Warren Commission on the
assassination of President Kennedy ....
Id.
The ABA initiated a study which suggested rules to govern public statements by law-
yers in criminal cases. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS Approved
Draft (1968) [hereinafter REARDON REPORT]. The study was recommended to the ABA by
the Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, which was chaired by Paul C. Reardon. Id.
The REARDON REPORT did not recommend restraint on the press. Id. at 68-73.
Instead, the Committee recommended that the ABA impose restrictions on the release of
information by lawyers and law enforcement officers. Id. at 76.
Other studies on the fair trial and free press issue were noted in Professor Matheson's
article on the free speech issue. Scott M. Matheson, The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free
Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865 (1990). These studies include: Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Special Committee on Radio, Television, and the Administration of
Justice, Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial: Final Report with Recommendations (1967);
American Newspaper Publishers Association, Free Press and Fair Trial (1967); Judicial Con-
ference of the United States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, Report of the
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "'Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45
F.R.D. 391, 404-05 (1969). Matheson, supra, at 873 n.37.
39. REARDON REPORT, supra note 38, § 1.1, at 2. The "reasonable likelihood" standard
was taken from language in Sheppard. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N ANNOTATED MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 241 (1984). See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
40. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF
ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY v-vi (Final Draft July 1,
1969).
41. Id. at 104 n.85. The Historical Comment to DR 7-107 provides:
The provisions of Sections (A), (B), (C), and (D) of this Disciplinary Rule [DR 7-
107 Trial Publicity] incorporate the fair trial-free press standards which apply to
lawyers as adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, Feb. 19, 1968, upon the
recommendation of the Fair Trial and Free Press Advisory Committee of the
ABA Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration of
Criminal Justice.
Id. Disciplinary Rule 7-107 provides:
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal
matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement
that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication and that does more than state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the
offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other
matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
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whether an extrajudicial comment is "reasonably likely" to have a
(B) A lawyer or lawfirm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal
matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint, information, or
indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the commence-
ment of the trial or disposition without trial, make or participate in making
an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dis-
seminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests,
indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser
offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement
given by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or
failure of the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the
merits of the case.
(C) DR 7-107 (B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from
announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to
aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may
present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of
weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the
length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized,
other than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or
law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall
not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reason-
able person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communi-
cation and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other
matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that
he may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the court
in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal mat-
ter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated
with the prosecution or defense shall not make or participate in the making
an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dis-
seminated by public communication and that is reasonably likely to affect
the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional disciplinary
proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent and con-
sistent with other law applicable to such proceedings.
(G) A lawyer or lawfirm associated with a civil action shall not during its investi-
gation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement,
other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication
and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or pro-
spective witness.
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prejudicial impact on the court proceeding.4 2 This standard is
very protective of a defendant's right to a fair trial.43 DR 7-107
was the second of three rules adopted by the ABA in an attempt to
limit extrajudicial statements from lawyers.
The adoption of DR 7-107, however, did not quiet the debate
about lawyer no-comment rules. While several courts upheld the
restrictions imposed by the "reasonable likelihood" standard, 4
other courts held that the standard unduly restricted attorneys'
First Amendment rights.45 Three cases, Hirschkop v. Snead,46
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or
failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as
required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the
action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or lawfirm
associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement,
other than a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication
if it is made outside the official course of the proceeding and relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or pro-
spective witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examinations or
tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions of an
interested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from replying
to charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from participating in
the proceeding of legislative, administrative, or other investigative bodies.(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees and associ-
ates from making an extrajudicial statement that he would be prohibited
from making under DR 7-107.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1969) (emphasis added). DR
7-107 has not been revised since 1969.
42. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.2, at 633 (1986). The terms
"reasonably likely" were taken from DR-7-107 of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY. For the text of DR 7-107, see supra note 41.
43. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 1979). The Snead court stated
that rules which endorse the "clear and present danger" standard "were inadequate to
protect judicial processes from the kind of extraneous influences which impaired their
frankness or objectivity or created the appearance of such unfairness." Id.
44. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488
U.S. 946 (1988); Central S.C. Chapter, Soc'y of Professional Journalists v. Martin, 431 F.
Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990
(1969); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Younger v. Smith,
106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981); In re
Hinds, 449 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1982); In re Rachmiel, 449 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1982); State v. Carter,
363 A.2d 366, rev'd, 365 A.2d 473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
45. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re
Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Markfield v. Association of the Bar, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82,
appeal dismissed, 375 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
46. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979). The issue in Hirschkop was whether rule 7-107 of the
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility violated the First Amendment right of lawyers.
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Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,4 7 and Markfield v. Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York,4 8 are frequently noted as
examples of the varying interpretation of and support for the "rea-
sonable likelihood" standard.49  These cases, in addition to
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,5 0 are often cited as the inspi-
-ration for the re-evaluation of the 1968 ABA standards and the
publication of the third ABA no-comment rule.51
The third ABA no-comment rule, Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, was adopted in 1983 by the ABA House of
Delegates.52 Rule 3.6, like DR 7-107 of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, emanates from ABA-drafted fair trial and
free press standards.53 The drafters of the Code of Professional
Conduct, however, did not incorporate the "clear and present
danger" standard which was recommended by the fair trial and
Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 361-62 (4th Cir. 1979). The Fourth Circuit discussed the
application of the "serious and imminent threat" standard to the review extrajudicial
comment by lawyers but rejected this standard in favor of one which is more protective of a
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 362. The court stated that "[t]he more appropriate
standard is that the publication present a reasonable likelihood that it will be prejudicial to
the fair administration of justice." Id.
47. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). In Bauer, the court
replaced the "reasonable likelihood" standard used in DR 7-107, with a narrower, more
restrictive standard-the "serious and imminent threat standard. Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
However, the Bauer court applied this standard in a very unique way: it placed the burden
on the defendant-attorney to prove that his or her statements were not a "serious and
imminent threat to the fair administration of justice." Id. at 251. The court stated:
We think that it is proper to formulate rules which would declare that comment
concerning certain matters will presumptively be deemed a serious and
imminent threat to the fair administration of justice so as to justify a prohibition
against them. One charge with violating such a rule would of course have the
opportunity to prove that his statement was not one that posed such a serious
and imminent threat, but the burden would be upon him.
Id.
48. 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, appeal dismissed, 375 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). In
Markfield, the court stated that the DR 7-107 "reasonable likelihood" standard may be
constitutionally sufficient but concluded that discipline should be applied only when it is
found that an attorney's extrajudicial statements present a "clear and present danger" to
the fair administration of justice. Markfield v. Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85, appeal dismissed, 375 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
49. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
240-41 (1984).
50. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
51. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 8-1.1(a), 8-7 to
8-13 (2d ed. 1980). The Bauer decision led to the incorporation of the "clear and present
danger" standard into the Fair Trial and Free Press standards. Id. at 8-7. See also
Matheson, supra note 38, at 875 (footnotes omitted) (noting that the decision in Nebraska
Press "spurred an ABA study on fair trial and free press issues"). See generally AMERICAN
BAR Ass'N ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 240-44 (1984)
(discussing the legal history of Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1991). For the text
of Rule 3.6, see supra note 11. Although the current edition of Model Rule 3.6 is dated
1991, its 1983 version of Rule 3.6 has not been revised.
53. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1991).
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free press committee.5" Instead, Rule 3.6 endorses the "substan-
tial likelihood" standard.55
Most states have adopted the "substantial likelihood" standard
recommended by the Model Rules;5 6 however, the application of
that test varies widely. For example, some courts and commenta-
tors equate the "substantial likelihood" standard with the "clear
and present danger" standard. Other courts have interpreted
the "substantial likelihood" standard to be less protective of an
attorney's right to freedom of speech and more deferential to the
54. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 and cmt. (1991). Compare
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 8-1.1(a) (2d ed. 1980),
which provides:
Extrajudicial statements by attorneys
(a) A lawyer shall not release or authorize the release of information or opinion
for dissemination by any means of public communication if such
dissemination would pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the
trial.
Id. at 8-5 (emphasis added). The committee that adopted this standard did so because
"[tihe profound concern for fairness to the criminal defendant reflected in Sheppard has
led to a serious distortion of first amendment values in high-publicity cases. The primary
thrust of the updated standards is to correct that distortion." Id. at 8-4. The Committee
also stated that "the reasonable likelihood test is too relaxed to provide full protection to the
first amendment interests of attorneys." Id. at 8-10.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991). For the text of Rule
3.6, see supra note 11. "The 'substantial likelihood' test of the Model Rules plainly permits
more extrajudicial commentary by lawyers than does the 'reasonable likelihood' test of DR
7-107." WOLFRAM, supra note 42, at 634.
56. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2741 n.1 (1991). Thirty-two states
have adopted Rule 3.6 of the Model Code of Professional Conduct either verbatim or with
minor changes. Id. These states therefore endorse the "substantial likelihood" standard.
For the text of MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6, see supra note 11.
57. See, e.g., Cox Arizona Publications, Inc. v. Collins, 818 P.2d 174 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991) (interpreting the "substantial likelihood" standard to require proof that the
"extrajudicial statement would pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial"),
review granted, 1991 Ariz. LEXIS 79 (Ariz. 1991); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 493 (N.J. 1982)
(stating that the "substantial likelihood" standard is the "linguistic equivalent" of the clear
and present danger test); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 379 (4th Cir. 1979) (Winter, J.,
and Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that the Supreme Court has "equated
the clear and present danger test with language that connotes a real and substantial threat
to the fairness of a trial"); 1GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 397 (2d
ed. 1990) ("To use traditional terminology, the danger of prejudice to a proceeding must be
both clear (material) and present (substantially likely)"); Joseph T. Rotondo, Note, A
Constitutional Assessment of Court Rules Restricting Lawyer Comment on Pending
Litigation, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1106, 1110-11 (1980) ("there is no constitutionally
significant difference between the reasonable likelihood of prejudice standard and the
serious and imminent threat standard. To properly apply either standard, courts must
exercise judgement by weighing numerous relevant factors. Courts, therefore, should
candidly adopt a balancing approach.").
Justice Kennedy, in Part I of his opinion, appears to equate the "substantial likelihood"
standards with the "clear and present danger" standard. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.,
111 S. Ct. 2720, 2725 (1991). He points out that the difference between the two standards
could prove to be "mere semantics." Id. According to Justice Kennedy, the words used to
describe the test are not as important as the application. Id. "Each standard requires an
assessment of proximity and degree of harm. Each may be capable of valid application."
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defendant's right to a fair trial."8 The diverse interpretation of the
"substantial likelihood" standard is troublesome because it does
not provide a concrete test. Unfortunately, the Gentile decision
does not clear the cloud of confusion. As one commentator noted:
"An attorney can only guess what will be protected speech when
four justices applying the same standard say it was a clear violation
and four others say that it was not even close." 59
As the history of the no-comment rules demonstrates, the cor-
rect standard of review applicable to extrajudicial speech by law-
yers has been a topic of debate for years. Depending on the
philosophy of a particular court, or the jurisdiction in which the
legal proceeding is held, an attorney may be subject to one of the
following trial publicity standards: 1) reasonable likelihood of
prejudice to a fair trial, 2) substantial likelihood of material preju-
dice, 3) serious and imminent threat of material prejudice, or
4) clear and present danger of material prejudice.6 0
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,6 1 the Court debated
whether lawyers who are participating in judicial proceedings may
be subjected to First-Amendment-free-speech restrictions that
could not be imposed on the press or the general public."' 62 The
Court concluded that "the speech of lawyers representing clients
in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding stan-
dard than the [clear and present danger test]; namely, the "sub-
58. See United States v. Simon, 664 F. Supp. 780, 783, 791-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (In its
decision to modify a restraining order which prohibited lawyers from commenting on a
case, the court rejected the argument that "specific findings must be made that the
expression 'restrained poses either a clear and present danger or a serious and imminent
threat to a protected competing interest."' Instead, the court appeared to endorse the
"reasonable likelihood" or "substantial likelihood" of an unfair trial standard: "[T]he Court
finds that an unrestrained field of attorneys and defendants would add enough fuel to an
already voracious fire of publicity to create, at the very least, a real and substantial
likelihood that some, if not all, defendants might be deprived of a fair trial."); In re
Eisenberg, 423 N.W.2d 867, 874 n.4 (Wis. 1988) (refusing to adopt the clear and present
danger standard of review in its trial publicity rule because it concluded that the
"substantial likelihood" standard was adquate and proper), petition denied, 470 N.W.2d 898
(1991).
59. Nina J. Emerson, Attorney Speech on Pending Trials, Wis. LAWYER, Oct. 1992, at
16.
60. Every state except California has adopted a trial publicity rule which incorporates
either the reasonable likelihood, substantial likelihood, serious and imminent threat, or
clear and present danger standard. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2741
n.1-3 (1991); supra note 56 & infra note 102.
61. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
62. The "clear and present danger" standard is used to determine whether the First
Amendment rights of the press or the general public have been violated. Id. at 2742-43.
1992]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:937
stantial likelihood" standard recommended by Rule 3.6 of the
Model Code of Professional Conduct.6 3
The Court based its conclusion on several considerations.
First, prior decisions of the Court, such as Sheppard v. Maxwell 64
and In re Sawyer,65 indicated that "the speech of those participat-
ing before the courts could be limited. ' 66 Second, lawyers have
unique access to the courts and information about specific cases.
Third, lawyers are "officers of the court," and are therefore subject
to stringent ethical standards by virtue of their status.68 Fourth,
the history of lawyer no-comment rules and the standard
approved by most lower courts support the "substantial likeli-
63. Id. at 2744-45. For the text of Rule 3.6, see supra note 11.
64. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
65. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
66. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2743 (1991) (footnote omitted). Justice Rehnquist cited to
In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), in support
of this statement. Id. He interpreted Sawyer to support the proposition that "lawyers in
pending cases [may be] subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen
would not be." Id. But see infra note 71 (noting that Sawyer cannot be used as an example
of the Court imposing restrictions on the First Amendment rights of attorneys by virtue of
their status). The Court also quoted the following statement from Sheppard:
"Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a
criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of
disciplinary measures." Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 363 (1966)).
67. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745 (1991). See also In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 496 (N.J.
1982) ("(Attorneys are] individuals who have confidential information and an intimate
knowledge of the merits of the prosecution. Their views are invested with particular
credibility and weight in light of their positions. Hence, their statements relating to the
trial are likely to be considered knowledgeable, reliable and true."); In re Rachmiel, 449
A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1982) ("[Attorneys] have a unique role and responsibility in the
administration of criminal justice and, therefore, have an extraordinary power to
undermine or destroy the efficacy of the criminal justice system." (citations omitted));
Matheson, supra note 38, at 885-89 (discussing the unique ethical duties of prosecutors
because of their role in the judicial system).
68. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743-45. The Court indicated that because lawyers play a
unique role in the judicial system, their right to publicly discuss legal proceedings may be
limited. "As officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary
responsibility not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the
accused or that will obstruct the fair administration of justice." Id. at 2744 (quoting
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976). See also Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) ("The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is
especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary government function of
administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.' "), rehearing denied,
423 U.S. 886 (1975); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) ("Membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.") (citation omitted); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594
F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Lawyers are officers of the courts and . .. they have very
special responsibilities for lending support to maintenance of the integrity of the judicial
system. The mores of the marketplace are not the measures for the conduct of lawyers and
judges, and lawyers may be held to higher standards than policemen."); National
Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman, 501 N.Y.S.2d 405, 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) ("[A]ttorneys,
as officers of the court, have a legal and ethical responsibility to safeguard the right to a fair
trial.") (citation omitted); In re Cieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321, 327 (N.D. 1978) ("As to
standards of conduct we have, on several occasions, stated that lawyers, being officers of the
court, hold a position of public trust and are held to a higher standard than laymen.")
(citations omitted).
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hood" standard.69
Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens disagreed
with the majority's creation of a lower standard for lawyer's
speech regarding a legal proceeding.7 ° Justice Kennedy argued
that there was no justification for relegating attorneys to a consti-
tutionally inferior status. He noted that the cases upon which the
State Bar of Nevada relied to justify restrictions on lawyer's speech
did not place restrictions on lawyers by virtue of their status, but
rather, placed restrictions only on the information released.7" Cit-
ing to In re Primus"2 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,73 Justice
69. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2740-43. Since the publication of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, most states have endorsed the "substantial likelihood" standard. See
supra note 56.
70. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2732-36.
71. Id. at 2733-34. The Respondent and Justice Rehnquist, who was writing for the
majority in parts I and II of the decision, relied upon Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20 (1984), In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959), Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966),
and Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), to support the proposition that an
attorney's speech concerning ongoing legal proceedings could be subjected to a lower
standard of review. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743-45. Justice Kennedy argued that in each of
these cases the Court suggested restrictions upon the information released, not a limitation
on the entire scope of speech by attorneys. Id. at 2733-34.
For example, in Seattle Times, the Court placed restrictions on the release of
information learned via the discovery process. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,
32 (1984). The Court restricted the release of specific information-not an attorney's right
to speak. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2733.
Similarly, in Sawyer, an attorney was disciplined for allegedly impugning the
impartiality and fairness of the presiding judge because she made statements about Smith
Act prosecutions. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 623-26. The Sawyer Court did not even address
the First Amendment issue. Id. at 627. Instead, it decided that the evidence was
insufficient to support a charge of professional misconduct. Id. at 626. Thus, there is strong
support for Justice Kennedy's argument that Sawyer cannot be used as an example of the
Court imposing restrictions on the First Amendment rights of attorneys by virtue of their
status. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2733.
Justice Kennedy also claimed that Sheppard cannot be viewed as a case which supports
blanket restrictions on the scope of a lawyer's speech because "the prejudice to Dr.
Sheppard's fair trial right can be traced in principal part to police and prosecutorial
irresponsibility and the trial court's failure to control the proceedings and the courthouse
environment." Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2734. Thus, Justice Kennedy implies that if the trial
court had imposed the necessary restrictions, and if the police officers and prosecutors had
acted responsibly, there would be no need for a blanket restriction on the speech of lawyers
involved in the judicial proceeding. See id. The penalty was imposed by the Court because
of the specific circumstances of this case, namely, regulation of the release of specific
information; not because there was a need to restrain the speech of all participants in a trial
by virtue of their status. Id.
In Nebraska Press, the Court addressed the question of whether a judge could restrain
the press from publishing information that may prejudice prospective jurors against the
defendant. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 541-44 (1976). Because the Nebraska Press court
addressed the issue of whether prior restraints could be imposed on the press, not on
attorneys, Justice Kennedy claimed that respondent's reliance on this case to impose a
lower standard of review on attorney's speech was improper. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2734.
72. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). The Primus Court found that an attorney who sent letters to
potential clients on behalf of the ACLU could not be disciplined for violating an attorney
disciplinary rule, because the solicitation was a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978).
73. 433 U.S. 350, reh 'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). The Bates Court favored a lawyer's
right to advertise, a limited First Amendment right, over a state disciplinary rule which
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Kennedy concluded that First Amendment rights are not sacri-
ficed at the expense of ethics regulations. 74 Accordingly, he
argued that a blanket rule imposing a lower standard of review on
the speech of attorneys who are participating in legal proceedings
was impermissible "without careful First Amendment scrutiny."'7 5
Justice Kennedy was not the first Supreme Court Justice to
refuse to subordinate First Amendment rights to Sixth Amend-
ment rights. In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,7 6 the Court
stated: "The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to
assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amend-
ment rights, ranking one as superior to the other. ' 77 Thus, as early
as 1976, the Court emphasized the importance of serving both
constitutional rights equally.
The State Bar of Nevada argued that the Procunier v. Marti-
nez 78 balancing test should be used to assess the restrictions on
attorneys' First Amendment rights.79 Justice Kennedy disagreed,
noting that the balancing test should not apply to political
speech.8 0 However, for the sake of argument, he applied the bal-
prohibited lawyers from advertising in newspapers or other media. Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
74. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2734. Justice Kennedy stated that "[alt the very least our
cases recognize that disciplinary rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity
protected by the First Amendment, and that First Amendment protection survives even
when the attorney violates a disciplinary rule he swore to obey when admitted to the
practice of law." Id. Thus, he refused to condone the imposition of categorical restrictions
of First Amendment rights for lawyers, under the circumstances in this case. Id.
75. Id. at 2734-35. Justice Kennedy was careful to point out that Model Rule 3.6 was
not unconstitutional as long as the "substantial likelihood" standard is interpreted to punish
"only speech that creates a danger of imminent and substantial harm." Id. at 2725. "Each
standard requires an assessment of proximity and degree of harm." Id.
76. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
77. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
78. 416 U.S. 396 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401
(1989). One of the issues in Procunier v. Martinez was "whether a particular regulation or
practice . . . constitutes an impermissible restraint of First Amendment liberties."
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). The "particular regulation" referred to in
Procunier permitted prisoner mail censorship. Id. at 398, 413. In applying a balancing test
that weighed the First Amendment rights of the prisoners against the state interest in
censoring the mail, the Court decided in favor of the inmates. Id. at 415-16.
79. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2734. The Procunier v. Martinez balancing test is as follows:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression....
Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved.
Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, found that
Nevada had a substantial interest in limiting lawyers' speech and that this restraint on
speech was narrowly tailored to achieve the state's objectives. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
80. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2733-36. Justice Kennedy stated that the cases used by the
respondent to support the use of the balancing test did not apply to the present situation.
Id. at 2733. Those cases decided issues relating to commercial speech or to a limitation on
the use of information learned during discovery. Id. The rationale applied in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), and Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984),
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ancing test and concluded that Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177,
as interpreted by the Nevada court, failed the test."1
Justice Kennedy applied the first prong of the balancing test
and determined that the State does not have a substantial interest
in limiting the First Amendment rights of lawyers without apply-
ing exacting scrutiny. 2 To further this argument, he noted that
very few cases are prejudiced by pretrial publicity.8 3 He also sug-
gested that there is less justification for imposing restrictions on
the speech of defense attorneys than for prosecuting attorneys.84
does not apply to this case because Mr. Gentile was punished for "pure" political speech.
See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2733. Political speech is subject to greater First Amendment
protection than commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977),
rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). In addition, Mr. Gentile did not release any
information acquired through the discovery process. See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2733.
Therefore, Gentile is distinguishable from Seattle Times and Bates. Id.
81. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2734-36 (1991).
82. Id. at 2734-35. For the text of the Procunier v. Martinez balancing test, see supra
note 79.
83. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2734. In concluding that very few cases are prejudiced by
pretrial publicity, Justice Kennedy relied on the following sources: Rita J. Simon, Does the
Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on
Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515, 528 (1977) (concluding that "for the most
part juries are able and willing to put aside extraneous information and base their decisions
on the evidence. The results show that when ordinary citizens become jurors, they assume
a special role in which they apply different standards of proof, more vigorous reasoning and
greater detachment."); Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary
Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) (concluding that "the magnitude of the fair trial-free press
issue may be overblown. Most trial judges and other judicial sources do not seem to
perceive frequent, major problems with prejudicial publicity.") (footnote omitted). Gentile,
111 S. Ct. at 2734.
Another study on the topic is reported at Ralph Frasca, Estimating the Occurrence of
Trials Prejudiced by Press Coverage, 72 JUDICATURE 162, 169 (1988). Professor Frasca
found that only two percent of jurors who are prejudiced by press coverage retain this
prejudice until they deliberate the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Id. He further
concluded that "assuming random distribution of all variables, press-induced bias would
occur .0001 per cent of the time, or in one of every 10,000 cases." Id. at 169. Professor
Frasca also noted that U.S. Circuit Court Judge William J. Bauer conducted a study which
concluded that only six percent of prospective jurors said, during voir dire, that they
remembered news stories about a highly-publicized case. Id. at 168. Scott Matheson also
provides a list of sources which support Justice Kennedy's argument that very few trials are
prejudiced by pretrial publicity because very few crimes are reported by the press.
Matheson, supra note 38, at 866 n.3 (1990).
Justice Kennedy was not the first Supreme Court justice to point out that few cases are
prejudiced by pretrial publicity. In Nebraska Press, Chief Justice Burger noted that "[iun
the overwhelming majority of criminal trials, pretrial publicity presents few unmanageable
threats to this important [Sixth Amendment] right." Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 551. He
also stated that "pervasive, adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial."
Id. at 554.
84. Gentile v. State of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2734 (1991). Justice Kennedy relied on
the following articles to argue that there is less justification for suppressing the speech of
defense lawyers than there is for prosecuting attorneys: Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An
Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003,
1031-49 (1984) and Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations:
What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 35 (1989). Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2734-35.
Other sources in support of this position are: Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d 242, 253 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that DR 7-107 should not be applied to defense
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In applying the second prong of the balancing test, 5 Justice
Kennedy argued that attorneys' speech cannot be suppressed sim-
ply because it is persuasive.8 6 He concluded that Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 177, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court,
"represents a limitation of First Amendment freedoms greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest, and does not protect against a danger of
the necessary gravity, imminence, or likelihood."8 7
Thus, while a majority of the Court concluded that the "sub-
stantial likelihood" standard should be applied to lawyers, 8 four
members of the Court argued that attorneys' speech should not be
subjected to a lower standard simply by virtue of their status.8 9
Instead, each situation should be reviewed to determine if the
attorney's speech "creates a danger of imminent and substantial
harm."90
B. VAGUENESS
The Gentile Court reviewed Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177
and found that "absent any clarifying interpretation" by the
Nevada Supreme Court, Rule 177(3)"' was unconstitutionally
attorneys before an indictment is issued), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 246 (1984) ("It has been
argued that limitations on extrajudicial comment should be applied only to prosecuting
lawyers and to plaintiffs' counsel."); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, Standard 8-1.1(a), 8-7 n.4 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that Standard 8-1.1(a) applies
equally to prosecuting attorneys and defense attorneys, but notes that several courts and
commentators are in disagreement with this position); Monroe H. Freedman & Janet
Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense
Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1977) (arguing that a
defense attorney's right to comment should not be limited); Matheson, supra note 38, at
884-88 (arguing that a prosecutor's role as advocate for the state, officer of the court,
executive branch employee, and political actor may subject him to restrictions on his or her
extrajudicial comment that do not apply to defense attorneys).
85. For the text of the Procunier v. Martinez balancing test, see supra note 79.
86. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2735. Justice Kennedy stated that "(i]f the dangers of
[attorneys'] speech arise from its persuasiveness, from their ability to explain judicial
proceedings, or from the likelihood the speech will be believed, these are not the sort of
dangers that can validate restrictions. The First Amendment does not permit suppression
of speech because of its power to command assent." Id.
87. Id. at 2736. There are less restrictive ways of ensuring that trial publicity does not
prejudice a fair trial. For example, a court could use procedural remedies such as change of
venue, continuances, searching voir dire and sequestration. Nina J. Emerson. Attorney
Speech on Pending Trials, Wis. LAWYER, Oct. 1992, at 64.
88. Id. at 2745.
89. Id. at 2733-34.
90. Id. at 2725.
91. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is reprinted in Appendix B of the Gentile
opinion. Id. at 2737-38. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6,
supra note 11. Rule 177(3) is identical to Rule 3.6(c) of the Model Code of Professional
Conduct except for the paragraph numbering system. Compare NEV. CT. R. 177 with
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6.
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vague.92 Subsection 177(3) provides, in pertinent part: "Not with-
standing Subsection 1 and 2(a-f), a lawyer involved in the investi-
gation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration: (a)
the general nature of the claim or defense: ... (c) ... the general
scope of the investigation .... .. Thus, subsection three appears
to permit an attorney to make certain statements even though
subsections one and two forbid such discussion. The rule was
found to be void for vagueness because the adjectives "general"
and "elaboration" in subsection three were "classic terms of
degree" providing no real guidance to the lawyer who wants to
make a public statement.94 "The lawyer has no principle for
determining when his remarks pass from the safe harbor of the
general to the forbidden sea of the elaborated.19 5 Thus, five mem-
bers of the Court held that subsection three of Nevada Supreme
Court Rule 177 was unconstitutionally vague on its face because of
its susceptibility to discriminatory enforcement.96
The Court also found that Rule 177(3) was vague as applied to
Mr. Gentile.97 In reviewing the press conference, the Court noted
that Mr. Gentile made a genuine attempt to comply with Rule
177.98 "The fact that Gentile was found in violation of the rules
after studying them and making a conscious effort at compliance
92. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731.
A statute will be held void for vagueness if the conduct forbidden by it is so unclearly
defined that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
"[G]enerally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the
main concerns of the vagueness doctrine are notice and arbitrary enforcement.
However, at least one court has asserted that the vagueness test will be applied less
stringently in cases where the defendant has been punished for breaking an administrative
rule as opposed to a criminal statute. Sloman v. Board of Pharmacy Examiners, 440 N.w.2d
609,611 (Iowa 1989). See also Gust v. Pomeroy, 466 N.W.2d 137, 140 (N.D. 1991) (rejecting
an argument that a regulatory statute was vague, the court stated that "the requirement of
notice of proscribed conduct is not more and may be less, stringent as applied to statutes
imposing non-criminal penalties"). For additional information regarding the vagueness
doctrine as applied to disciplinary or administrative rules, see infra text accompanying
notes 137-49.
93. NEV. CT. R. 177. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is reprinted in Appendix B of
the Gentile opinion. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2737-38. See also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6, supra note 11. Rule 177(3) is identical to Rule 3.6(c) of
the Model Code of Professional Conduct except for the paragraph numbering system.
Compare NEV. CT. B. 177 with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6.
94. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731. Because Model Rule 3.6 contains the same verbage,
many states may face similar vagueness problems unless state courts narrowly construe
their no-comment rule. For the text of Rule 3.6 of the Model Code of Professional Conduct,
see supra note 11.
95. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731.
96. Id. at 2732.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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demonstrates that Rule 177 creates a trap for the wary as well as
the unwary." 99 The Court reasoned that because Mr. Gentile was
found to be in violation of Rule 177, the rule was too imprecise to
survive a constitutional challenge. 100 Accordingly, the Court held
that Rule 177(3) was void for vagueness.'
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATION TO NORTH
DAKOTA LAW
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
North Dakota is one of only six states to endorse a trial public-
ity standard of scrutiny which is more speech-protective than Rule
3.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.10 2 Rule 3.6 of the
North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
Trial Publicity
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement
that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated
by means of mass public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the statement will
create a serious and imminent threat of materially preju-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2732. In a dissenting opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, however, four
members of the Court argued that subsection three, as applied to Mr. Gentile, was not
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2746-47. Justice Rehnquist noted that the two issues
addressed by the vagueness doctrine were the "defendant's right to fair notice and
adequate warning." Id. at 2746. He concluded that because Mr. Gentile "admitted that his
primary objective in holding the press conference was the violation of Rule 177's core
prohibition-to prejudice the upcoming trial by influencing potential jurors," Gentile could
not claim that he was not given notice or a warning. Id. Thus, Justice Rehnquist argued
that Rule 177 gave Mr. Gentile adequate notice that his statements at the press conference
were "substantially likely" to have a prejudicial effect. Id. Justice Rehnquist also stated that
Rule 177 was constitutional on its face,.thereby dismissing Mr. Gentile's argument that the
rule was facially vague and overbroad. Id.
102. The six states are Alabama, Illinois, Maine, Oregon, North Dakota and Virginia.
See ALA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1990) ("substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." However, the comments to the rule
provide that the "serious and imminent threat" standard is to be applied.); ILL. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992) ("serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an
adjudicative proceeding"); ME. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.70) (1992)
("substantial danger of interference with the administration of justice"); N.D. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992) ("serious and imminent threat of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding"); OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-107 (1991) ("serious and imminent threat to the fact-finding process in an adjudicative
proceeding and acts with indifference to that effect"); VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106 (1992) ("clear and present danger of interfering with the fairness
of the trial by a jury").
The District of Columbia also adopted a very speech protective standard. See D.C.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992) ("serious and immiment [sic] threat to
the impartiality of the judge or jury").
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dicing an adjudicative proceeding. 1 0 3
There have been no North Dakota appellate decisions inter-
preting Rule 3.6, nor has the State Bar Association of North Dakota
Ethics Committee issued a formal or informal opinion on the issue
of trial publicity.10 4 Therefore, a review of North Dakota Supreme
Court decisions regarding the topic of trial publicity, in its general
sense, may provide guidance in interpreting the standard.
Many North Dakota trial publicity cases address the question
of whether a defendant is entitled to a change of venue.'0 5 In
most of the cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld lower
court decisions refusing to grant a change of venue due to pretrial
publicity. 10 6 In determining whether to grant a change of venue,
103. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991) (emphasis added).
North Dakota modeled its rule after a District of Columbia trial publicity rule. North
Dakota Attorney Standards Comm., Minutes of the Professional Conduct Subcomm., at 12
(November 8, 1985) ("PAUL EBELTOFT MADE AND JUDGE KERIAN SECONDED A MOTION TO
APPROVE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DRAFT RULE 3.6 WITHOUT CHANGE TO REPLACE
THE ABA MODEL RULE 3.6. PASSED UNANIMOUSLY."). Minor revisions were made to Rule
3.6 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct on January 31, 1986, but the
standard remained unchanged. See North Dakota Attorney Standards Comm., Minutes of
the Professional Conduct Subcomm., at 12 (January 31, 1986).
The "serious and imminent threat" standard appears to have originated from Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
The court in Bauer adopted the "serious and imminent threat" standard. Id. at 249. The
Comments to Rule 3.6 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct cite to the "ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and
Free Press, as amended in 1978" as the source of the standard. N.D. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1992). The ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial
and Free Press adopted the "clear and present danger" standard. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 8-1.1(a), 8-5 (2d ed. 1980). The decision in
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer led to the incorporation of the "clear and present
danger" standard into the Fair Trial and Free Press standards. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 8-1.1(a), 8-7 (2d ed. 1980).
104. The author of this article conducted an electronic search and a manual search in
an effort to find a recent appellate decision discussing Rule 3.6 of the North Dakota Rules of
Professional Conduct. The manual search included a review of Shepard's Citators, the
comments to Rule 3.6, and the legislative history of Rule 3.6. No decisions were discovered.
The search for an ethics opinions on point was conducted by requesting the State Bar
Association of North Dakota Ethics Committee to send a copy of all decisions issued in
North Dakota. No opinions on trial publicity were discovered. In addition, the author
searched the ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct for copies of or articles
on North Dakota Ethics Opinions and court decisions. The search was fruitless. If there are
any trial publicity decisions, it appears that they have not been published.
105. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 106.
106. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (holding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to change the venue due to pretrial publicity in a
case in which the defendant was convicted of murdering her husband); Houle v. North
Dakota Dist. Court, 293 N.W.2d 872 (N.D. 1980) (determining that the pretrial publicity
was not prejudicial to the defendant and would not prevent him from receiving a fair trial.
Thus, the decision to deny defendant's change of venue request was affirmed.); Basin Elec.
Power Coop. v. Boschker, 289 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1980) (refusing to grant a change of venue
was not an abuse of discretion); State v. Engel, 289 N.W.2d 204 (N.D. 1980) (denial of
defendant's request to a change of venue was not an abuse of discretion); State v. Page, 277
N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1979) (denial of defendant's request for a change of venue was not an
abuse of discretion).
Two cases differ from this pattern. In Jerry Harmon Motors v. First Natl Bank, the
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the court generally applied the "reasonable likelihood of preju-
dice" standard. 10 7
In all other cases, however, the North Dakota Supreme Court
applied a more speech-protective standard. For example, in State
v. McLain 10 8 the court stated: "We will not presume unfairness of
a constitutional magnitude unless a trial atmosphere existed which
was utterly corrupted by media coverage."10 9 In State v. Klein, 110
KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 1 ' and State v. Teigen, 1 2 the court
stressed the importance of the public's right to information about
court proceedings.1 13 The court also supports the presumption
that jurors will remain impartial regardless of pretrial publicity.1 1 4
court upheld a district court decision to grant a change of venue. Jerry Harmon Motors v.
First Nat'l Bank, 440 N.W.2d 704 (N.D. 1989). "The district court stated that the pre-trial
publicity was not inherently prejudicial, but recognized the likelihood that 'some
polarization' still existed. In our view there was ample evidence presented to the district
court to suggest that 'some polarization' still existed.'" Id. at 708.
In Olson v. North Dakota District Court, the court overruled a lower court decision to
deny defendant's motion for change of venue from Fargo to Minot. Olson v. North Dakota
Dist. Court, 271 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1978). The court applied the "reasonable likelihood of
prejudice" standard and determined that the motion should have been granted. Id. at 579-
83 (N.D. 1978).
107. The "reasonable likelihood" standard was adopted in Olson v. North Dakota Dist.
Court, 271 N.W.2d 574, 579 (N.D. 1978).
108. 301 N.W.2d 616 (N.D.), appeal denied, 312 N.W.2d 343 (N.D. 1981).
109. State v. McLain, 301 N.W.2d 616, 623 (N.D.) (citations omitted) (emphasis added),
appeal denied, 312 N.W.2d 343 (N.D. 1981).
110. 438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989).
111. 298 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1980).
112. 289 N.W.2d 242 (N.D. 1980).
113. State v. Klein, 438 N.W.2d 798, 801 (N.D. 1989); KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298
N.W.2d 505, 513 (N.D. 1980); State v. Teigen, 289 N.W.2d 242, 245 (N.D. 1980).
In Klein, the court held that the trial court was required to hold a hearing before
excluding the public from a courtroom during the testimony of a child. Klein, 438 N.W.2d
at 802-03. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "'[the presumption of
openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'" Id. at
801 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). See
also State v. La Fontaine, 293 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1980) (affirming a lower court's decision to
refuse to close a pretrial proceeding).
In KFGO Radio, the court upheld the district court's decision to allow the press access
to a state's attorney's inquiry. KFGO Radio, 298 N.W.2d at 514. The court emphasized the
importance of a defendant's right to a fair trial by declaring that "the right of access to
judicial proceedings is limited both by the constitutional right to a fair trial and by the
needs of government to obtain just convictions and to preserve the confidentiality of
sensitive information and the identity of informants." Id. at 513. The holding of the court,
however, appears to give priority to the First Amendment freedom of the press. The court
decided to open the state's attorney's inquiry because there was an "absence of legislation
which requires that the inquiry be closed to the public." Id. at 514. The court could have
given more deference to the defendant's right to a fair trial, but instead chose to support
the freedom of the press in the absence of legislation to the contrary.
The Teigen court stated that "[t]he publication of judicial proceedings may be to the
disadvantage of a particular individual. However, such proceedings are events of legitimate
public concern. It is important both to the community and to the criminal process that the
public be informed of events that transpire in the courtroom." Teigen, 289 N.W.2d at 245.
114. State v. Olson, 274 N.W.2d 190 (N.D. 1978). In Olson, the court determined that
pretrial publicity was not prejudicial enough to cause a mistrial. Id. at 193. In reaching this
conclusion, the court stated that:
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Thus, if an attorney is disciplined for making extrajudicial state-
ments, it appears that the North Dakota Supreme Court would
uphold the "serious and imminent threat" standard. 115
Although Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada116 may tempt the
Professional Conduct Subcommittee and the North Dakota
Supreme Court to lower the standard of scrutiny, Justice Ken-
nedy's argument for a more speech-protective standard should be
persuasive to North Dakota decision-makers for several reasons.
First, discussion regarding judicial proceedings is political speech.
"There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the
State's power lies at the very center of the First Amendment....
The judicial system, and in particular our criminal justice courts,
play a vital part in a democratic state, and the public has a legiti-
In determining whether a defendant was deprived of a fair and impartial jury,
the court will not readily discount the assurances of a juror as to his impartiality.
It remains open to the defendant to demonstrate the actual existence of such an
opinion in the mind of the juror to overcome a presumption of impartiality and
raise a presumption of partiality.
Id.
See also State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664, 668 (N.D. 1980) (stating that "knowledge
obtained from news coverage and 'common gossip' does not automatically disqualify a per-
son from serving as a juror."); State v. Lueder, 242 N.W.2d 142, 147 (N.D. 1976) (stating that
proof of prejudice is required in order to prove that pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial).
In addition, Justice Kennedy noted that very few cases are prejudiced by pretrial pub-
licity. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
115. In only one case did the court appear to subordinate First Amendment rights to a
defendant's right to a fair trial. In Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 338 N.W.2d 72
(N.D. 1983), the court stated:
The news media's access to the courtroom is subordinate to the defendant's right
to a fair trial. The news media under the North Dakota Constitution does not
have any greater right than it has under the United States Constitution.
Consequently, the opinions of the United States Supreme Court on this topic
have full application in this state. If anything is different, it is the caveat
contained in Article I, Section 4, North Dakota Constitution, in effect providing
that the persons who write, speak and publish their opinions are... 'responsible
for the abuse of that privilege.'
Id. at 79 (citations omitted). But see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976)
(stating that "'[the authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as
between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the
other."); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) ("there can be little doubt that the
explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the
implicit First Amendment right of the press and the public.")
However, Jorgensen is distinguishable from the other trial publicity cases discussed
above. In determining whether to grant the press access to a preliminary examination, the
court in Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 338 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1983), was careful
to note that "[tihe preliminary examination is not a trial nor is it a pretrial proceeding." Id.
at 75. Thus, the court was not setting a policy of prioritizing a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights over the First Amendment right to freedom of the press. Instead, the court
considered the prejudicial effect of publicizing a preliminary examination and determined
that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
issuing an order to close a preliminary hearing. Id. at 79-81. See also Minot Daily News v.
Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1986) (providing a procedure for determining when motions
to close preliminary examinations may be granted).
116. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
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mate interest in their operation."'"17 The "substantial likelihood"
standard suppresses lawyers' speech, thereby preventing the peo-
ple who best understand the legal process from commenting on
the judicial system. The lower standard also interferes with the
public's right to know because it limits access to information from
an attorney."" There is no constitutional justification for sup-
pressing political speech from lawyers, simply because they par-
ticipate in the judicial system." 9
Second, the "substantial likelihood" standard should not be
adopted in North Dakota because there are less restrictive ways of
ensuring that pretrial publicity does not prejudice a fair trial. For
example, a court could use procedural remedies such as change of
venue, continuances, searching voir dire, or sequestration. 20 In
the event that these remedies do not work, a court may order a
new trial.' 2 1 A court could also consider drafting a judicial order
that "directly define[s] protected and unprotected speech after
considering evidence presented at an adversarial proceeding.' ' 22
Third, Justice Kennedy's argument for a more speech-protec-
tive standard should be persuasive to North Dakota decision-mak-
ers because they do not appear willing to subordinate attorneys'
First-Amendment-free-speech rights to defendants' Sixth-Amend-
ment-fair-trial rights. The "substantial likelihood" standard is a
blanket limitation on lawyers' speech about pending trials which
elevates Sixth Amendment fair trial interests over First Amend-
ment rights.1 23 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court is
very protective of the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.12 4 Additionally, the Professional Conduct Subcommittee
is apparently concerned about the First Amendment rights of law-
117. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2724.
118. Nina J. Emerson, Attorney Speech on Pending Trials, Wis. LAWYER, Oct. 1992, at
64 [hereinafter Attorney Speech].
119. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. 2735-36.
120. Attorney Speech, supra note 118, at 64.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., City of Jamestown v. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d 830 (N.D. 1991); City of
Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1991); State v. Klein, 438 N.W.2d 798 (N.D.
1989); State v. McLain, 301 N.W.2d 616 (N.D.), appeal denied, 312 N.W.2d 343 (N.D. 1981);
KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1980); State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664
(N.D. 1980); State v. Teigen, 289 N.W.2d 242 (N.D. 1980); State v. Olson, 274 N.W.2d 190
(N.D. 1978); State v. Leuder, 242 N.W.2d 142 (N.D. 1976). See also Charles A. Stock,
Comment, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-North Dakota's Disorderly Conduct
Statute: Is it Limited to Fighting Words, or Unconstitutionally Overbroad and Vague?, 67
N.D. L. REV. 123, 150-51 (1991) (noting that the North Dakota Supreme Court endorsed a
progressive First Amendment position when it tacitly acknowledged that a police officer
must exercise a higher degree of restraint when verbally challenged or criticized).
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yers, because it adopted the "serious and imminent threat" stan-
dard instead of endorsing the lower "substantial likelihood"
standard recommended by Rule 3.6 of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Conduct. 125 Therefore, the drafters of Rule 3.6 of the North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct should not change the stan-
dard of scrutiny as a result of Gentile.
B. OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS
The decision in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada126 also raises
questions about the constitutionality of Rule 3.6 of the North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct. In Gentile, Justice Rehn-
quist argued that Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 was not over-
broad because it "applie[d] only to lawyers involved in the
pending case at issue."'1 27 The North Dakota no-comment rule,
however, is not limited to attorneys participating in pending litiga-
tion. 128 In fact, the authors of the rule specifically intended the
rule to apply to all lawyers whether or not they are involved in the
125. For the text of Rule 3.6 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, see
supra text accompanying note 103. See also N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.6 cmt. (1991). For the text of Model Rule 3.6, see supra note 11.
126. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
127. Id. at 2746. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist clarified that the Court
was not ruling on the issue of whether Rule 177 would be unconstitutional if applied to a
lawyer that was not participating in a pending case. Id. at 2744 n.5. However, he did point
out that the Court has applied the "clear and present danger" standard to the speech of an
"officer of the court" when he made the statements in "his capacity as a private citizen."
Id. at 2744 n.5 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)). Thus, it appears that Justice
Rehnquist considers participation in a legal proceeding a significant factor in the
determination of whether a no-comment rule is overbroad.
A statute or rule is overbroad if "it offends the constitutional principle that 'a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected [First Amendment] freedoms.'" Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 250 (1967). "Because First Amendment Freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 433 (1963). Statutes regulating speech must "punish only unprotected speech and
not be susceptible of application to protected expression." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
522 (1972). When a statute "is susceptible of application to protected speech, . . .[it] is
constitutionally overbroad and therefore is facially invalid." Lewis v. City of New Orleans,
415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974).
128. See N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992).
Of the six states that endorse a more speech-protective standard, two specifically
provide that the rule governing trial publicity applies to lawyers participating in an
adjudicative proceeding only. See ALA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1990)
("A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement ...."); ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992) ("A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement .. "); ME.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.70) (1992) ("A lawyer involved in the
prosecution or defense of a criminal matter or in representing a party to a civil cause .... ");
N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992) ("A lawyer shall not make an
extrajudicial statement .... ); OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107
(1992) ("A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement .... "); VA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106 (1992) ("A lawyer participating in or associated
with the investigation or the prosecution or the defense of a criminal matter ....").
The District of Columbia also narrowed its rule to apply to lawyers participating in a
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pending case about which the comment was made.'2 9 It appears
that the Gentile Court would find this broad construction
unconstitutional.13 0
legal proceeding. See D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992) ("A lawyer
engaged in a case being tried to a judge or jury .... ).
In addition to Alabama, Illinois, North Dakota and Oregon, thirty states endorse a no-
comment rule which applies to all lawyers: "A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial
statement...." See ARIz. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ER 3.6 (1992); ARK. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992); CONN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991); DEL. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6
(1987); FLA. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-3.6 (1992); IDAHO RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1986); IND. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.6 (1992); Ky. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992); RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE LA. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION Rule 3.6 (1991); MD.
LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992); MICH. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991); MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.6 (1991); MISS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992); Mo. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992); MONT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.6 (1991); NEV. CT. R. 177 (1991); N.H. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6
(1992); N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992); N.M. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16-306 (1991); OKLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.6 (1991); PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991); R.I. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991-92); S.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1991); S.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1987);
TEX. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.07 (1991); UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992); WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992);
W.VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991); WIS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS Rule 3.6 (1991); WYo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
ATTORNEYS AT LAW Rule 3.6 (1986). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.6, supra note 11.
In addition to Maine, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, thirteen states endorse a
no-comment rule that only applies to lawyers participating in or associated with a legal
proceeding. ALASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1992-93); COLO.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1990); GA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1992); HAW. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
107 (1991); IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR 7-107 (1992);
KAN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1988); MASS. CANONS OF ETHICS AND
DISCIPLINARY RULES REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF LAW DR 7-107 (1992); NEB. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1991); N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 7.7 (1992); N.Y. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1991); OHIO
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1991-92); TENN. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1992-93); VT. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1986). See also MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107, supra note 41.
129. North Dakota Attorney Standards Comm., Minutes of the Professional Conduct
Subcomm., at 5 (January 31, 1986) ("There was a discussion of the scope of the attorney
universe to which the rule applies and it was agreed that it applies to all attorneys, whether
of record in the case or not.")
130. Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that Nevada Court Rule 177 was not
overbroad because it "applie[d] only to lawyers involved in the pending case at issue."
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2746. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for five members of the Court, noted that the Court has applied the "clear and
present danger" standard to the speech of an "officer of the court" when he made the
statements in "his capacity as a private citizen." Id. at 2744 n.5 (citing Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375 (1962)) (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that if an attorney who was not
participating in the pending litigation was punished for commenting about a case, the
Court would find that the no-comment rule was overbroad.
In addition, the four members of the Court who did not join in this part of the opinion
would likely find that Rule 3.6 is overbroad, if applied to an attorney who was not
participating in the pending litigation. The four members, Justices Kennedy, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, argued for a more speech-protective standard. Gentile, 111 S. Ct.
962
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Several legal scholars also argue that a no-comment rule that
is applied to all lawyers is unconstitutionally overbroad.' 3 1 An
application of their argument follows: If Rule 3.6 of the North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct is literally enforced, a law-
yer-politician may be disciplined for publicly commenting on a
legal proceeding taking place anywhere in North Dakota. 13 2 Law-
yers who are participating in a legal action are prohibited from
sharing certain information about the case because they have
access to certain privileged information not provided to the pub-
lic.13 3 Clearly, this rationale cannot apply to lawyers who are not
participating in the case.'3 4 If Rule 3.6 were enforced against all
lawyers, persons who best understand how our system of justice
works would be forbidden from commenting on a legal proceed-
ing even if they had no inside information about the case. For
example, the trial publicity rule would prohibit a lawyer from criti-
cizing a state attorney's method of prosecuting a case even if the
lawyer lived in a different county and had not participated in the
proceeding.13 5 This rule, if applied in this manner, would create a
danger of chilling protected speech. Thus, without the proper
narrowing construction, Rule 3.6 is overbroad and should be
at 2723-36. Although they did not address the overbreadth issues, it is very likely that they
would find that the rule was overbroad if there were a risk of chilling speech. See id.
131. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 42, at § 12.2. In discussing the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.6, Professor Wolfram argues that if the rule is interpreted to
apply to all lawyers, it is overbroad.
Possibly through oversight, MR 3.6 is not limited to a lawyer connected with a
case in any way and thus might be thought to extend to any lawyer, including,
for example, a lawyer in public office. The policy and constitutional infirmities of
such a wide application are patent. Possibly the rule assumes that only a lawyer
intimately connected with the case would be in a position to satisfy the
requirement that a lawyer know that the statement will have a substantial
likelihood of material prejudice to the proceeding.
Id. at 634 n.2. See also Matheson, supra note 38, at 875 n.51 ("Unless read with an implicit
limitation to lawyers commenting on their own cases, MR [Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility] 3.6 plainly is overbroad.").
132. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
133. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2745 (1991).
134. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). In Wood, a county sheriff was held in
contempt by a county court for publicly criticizing a judge. Id. at 376. "Although the
sheriff was technically an 'officer of the court' by virtue of his position, the Court
determined that his statements were made in his capacity as a private citizen, with no
connection to his official duties." Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2744 n.5
(1991) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 393 (1962). Therefore, the lower court
conviction was reversed. Wood, 370 U.S. at 395.
135. Taking this example a step further, the rule could be interpreted to prohibit
members of the North Dakota Bar from serving as a legal commentator for the local
newspaper or television station. In addition, the rule appears to prohibit members of the
North Dakota Bar who are practicing in other states from commenting on a North Dakota
proceeding even if they are not participating in the case.
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Rule 3.6 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct is
also susceptible to a vagueness challenge. 13 7 Rule 3.6 consists of a
single standard of scrutiny, unlike Rule 3.6 of the Model Code of
Professional Conduct which contains a single standard of scrutiny,
a list of prohibitions, and a summary of circumstances in which the
rule should be applied. 3 At least one court has noted that a stan-
dard of review, by itself, will not withstand First Amendment scru-
tiny.13 9  In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,140 the court
stated that "specific rules are . . . necessary in order to avoid
vagueness.' 14' By applying the Bauer rationale to Rule 3.6, one
could argue that a single standard alone, without an accompanying
list of prohibitions, does not adequately clarify what conduct is for-
bidden. Thus, the rule does not provide sufficient notice of what
conduct is prohibited and is therefore susceptible to arbitrary
136. The comments to Rule 3.6 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct
appear to encourage this kind of narrowing.
Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the
information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly
where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be
the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum
and the exclusionary rules of evidence.
N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1992).
137. For an explanation of the vagueness doctrine, see supra note 92.
138. Compare N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992) with MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1991).
139. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976). In Bauer, the court stated that:
[The] standard [of review] is not constitutionally sufficient by itself. While the
application of the standard to these rules can eliminate overbreadth, the specific
rules are also necessary in order to avoid vagueness. The rules furnish the
context necessary to determine what may constitute a 'serious and imminent
threat' of interference with the fair administration of justice.
Id. at 249-50. But see In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126 (D.C. 1977) ("language of a rule setting
guidelines for members of the bar need not meet the precise standards of clarity that might
be required of rules of conduct for laymen."), overruled by In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919
(D.C. 1987).
140. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
141. Id. at 249-50. In his analysis of the Bauer decision, one commentator noted that:
The traditional requirement that criminal statutes speak with certainty applies
with equal force to bar regulations because only specific language can assure
evenhanded enforcement of disciplinary rules. While the law demands
specificity from all occupational regulations, the Supreme Court in In re Ruffalo
specifically characterized the disciplining of attorneys as a quasi-criminal
process. Due process requires that lawyers receive adequate notice of
disciplinary restrictions that might subject them to disbarment, and speech
restrictions require even greater precisions to avoid chilling first amendment
rights.... The quasi-criminal sanctions of the trial publicity rules, coupled with
their prior restraint characteristics, warranted the Bauer court's review for
overbreadth and vagueness.
William Ogden, Note, Professional Responsibility-Trial Publicity-Speech Restrictions
Must Be Narrowly Drawn. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1158,
1162-63 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
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Conversely, one could argue that vagueness is less of a con-
cern in the context of lawyer disciplinary rules because they
impose different penalties than criminal statutes. In that regard,
the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that "the require-
ment of notice of proscribed conduct is not more, and may be less,
stringent as applied to statutes imposing non-criminal penal-
ties .... ,,4 Lawyer disciplinary procedures and penalties, how-
ever, are at least quasi-criminal in nature. 44 Thus, disciplinary
rules, like criminal statutes must be drawn precisely to comply
with the stringent notice requirements of the vagueness
142. See supra note 92. Conversely, one could argue that by limiting Rule 3.6 to a
single standard, rather than providing a detailed list of prohibitions, the writers of the rule
intended to avoid substituting a blanket rule for rationale. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text. In providing attorneys with a detailed list of what to say and when to
say it, the rule provides guidance to judges who must decide if attorneys violate the rule.
This may be a problem if the judge enforces the rule without considering the reasons for it.
For example, subsection a of Model Rule 3.6 provides that "a lawyer shall not make an
extrajudicial statement ...." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6, supra
note 11. The rule applies to all lawyers; it is not limited to lawyers participating in pending
litigation. Id. Clearly the interest of a fair trial would not extend to an attorney who
worked in a different district or county and who was not in any way associated with the
case. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. However, this interpretation would
infringe on the attorney's First Amendment rights because the rule is overbroad. Id. If a
judge interpreted the rule to apply to all lawyers, he or she would be substituting the rule
for rationale.
Rule 3.6, as written, forces the court or disciplinary board to look at the circumstances
of each case and determine whether an attorney's comments about a judicial proceeding
"create a serious and imminent threat of materially prejudicing" the case. N.D. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992). See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
Thus, a North Dakota court or disciplinary board that reviews a lawyer's extrajudicial
comments is forced to justify its disciplinary decision rather than merely relying on a listed
standard. It must apply the traditional First Amendment standard to attorneys, who may
have certain limits on the information they can convey. The standard does not permit the
court or the disciplinary board to penalize the attorney simply because he or she is an
attorney, without first considering the circumstances of the speech. See supra notes 71 & 75
and accompanying text. However, because application of the North Dakota no-comment
rule is solely the discretion of the judge, the rule is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement and
may be unconstitutionally vague for that reason alone. See supra note 92.
143. Gust v. Pomeroy, 466 N.W.2d 137, 140 (N.D. 1991). See also Sloman v. Board of
Pharmacy Examiners, 440 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Iowa 1989) (stating that "when the action
taken for violation of the statute is civil in nature ... the test for vagueness is less stringent:
'Even if more specific language could be devised, it is apparent the absence of criminal
sanctions requires less literal exactitude to comport with due process; unless the statute
clearly, palpably and without doubt infringes the constitution it will be upheld.' ") (citations
omitted); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 39 (Or. 1990) ("the potential sanction, [for violating
DR 7-107 of the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility] though of course serious to a
lawyer, is not punitive but professional. It is civil, not penal." (quoting In re Lasswell, 673
P.2d 855, 857 (Or. 1983)).
144. In In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961, modified, 392 U.S. 919
(1968), the United States Supreme Court found that "[d]isbarment, designed to protect the
public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. He is accordingly entitled to
procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the charge. . . . These [lawyer
disbarment processes] are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature." Id. at 550-51
(citations omitted).
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The Gentile decision also supports the proposition that disci-
plinary rules, like criminal statutes, are subject to stringent notice
requirements. In Gentile, the Court held that subsection three of
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, a non-criminal rule, was void for
vagueness.' 4 6 In finding that the rule was unconstitutionally
vague, the Court did not imply that the test for vagueness was less
stringent for disciplinary rules than for criminal statutes.14 7
In addition, the North Dakota Supreme Court has noted that
"a higher degree of specificity may be required when First
Amendment rights are involved.' 4 8 Thus, the North Dakota Pro-
fessional Conduct Subcommittee may want to consider rewriting
Rule 3.6 of the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct to
include a list of specific prohibitions similar to those set out in Rule
3.6 of the Model Code of Professional Conduct or Disciplinary
Rule 7-107 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 149
V. CONCLUSION
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,15° the Court concluded that
a lawyer who is representing a criminal defendant in a legal pro-
ceeding may be disciplined for making statements to the press
even though the lawyer's remarks do not present a "clear and
present danger" to the fair adjudication of the case.' The Court
held that the disciplinary board must merely make a showing that
the attorney knew or reasonably should have known that his or
her statements would have a "substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing that proceeding."' 5 2 While the standard applied to
the press and the general public is the "clear and present danger"
standard, the Court determined that attorneys participating in a
legal proceeding could be subject to a lower standard of scrutiny
because attorneys have unique responsibilities to the judicial
system. '5
3
The Gentile decision may tempt the North Dakota Profes-
145. Id.
146. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2731 (1991).
147. See id. at 2731-32.
148. State v. Dallmann, 441 N.W.2d 912, 915 (N.D. 1989) (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 485 (1965)). See United States v. Scharfman, 448 F.2d 1352, 1354 (2d Cir. 1971)
("when First Amendment rights are not involved, the specificity requirement is more
flexible"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972).
149. For the text of the model rules, see supra notes 11 and 41.
150. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
151. Id. at 2742-45.
152. Id. at 2745.
153. Id. at 2742-45.
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sional Conduct Subcommittee and the North Dakota Supreme
Court to revise the "serious and imminent threat" standard in
North Dakota's trial publicity rule.15 4 However, Justice Kennedy's
argument for a more speech-protective standard should be persua-
sive to North Dakota decision-makers. 155 Neither the North
Dakota Supreme Court nor the Professional Conduct Subcommit-
tee appear willing to subordinate an attorney's First-Amendment-
free-speech rights to a defendant's Sixth-Amendment-fair-trial
rights.' 56 Both rights are considered carefully.1 57 Accordingly,
two changes in the North Dakota trial publicity rule are necessary.
First, the "serious and imminent threat" standard in Rule 3.6 of
the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct must be com-
bined with a list of specific prohibitions similar to those contained
in Rule 3.6 of the Model Code of Professional Conduct. Second,
Rule 3.6 must be amended to discipline only those attorneys who
comment about a legal proceeding in which they are participat-
ing. If these changes are made, the new trial publicity rule will
grant North Dakota lawyers the full panoply of free speech rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
Shon Kaelberer Hastings
154. The Gentile decision does not directly affect North Dakota because the Court's
holding was limited to the Nevada rule and because the state endorses a standard
approximating the clear and present danger standard in its trial publicity rule. See N.D.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6, supra note 103 and accompanying text. See
also N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1992).
155. Id. at 2724-25. See also supra notes 124 & 125 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 124 & 125 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota rules
and case law).
157. Id.
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